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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant-defendant Mohamed Youla ("Y oula") pled guilty 
to count three of a four-count indictment, charging him 
with falsely representing a Social Security number to be his 
own for the purpose of defrauding MBNA America Bank, 
National Association ("MBNA"), in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
S 408(a)(7)(B), and 18 U.S.C. S 2. Y oula was sentenced to 
thirty-three months imprisonment, a $6000 fine, a $100 
assessment, and a three year term of supervised release. 
He argues on appeal that the District Court for the District 
of Delaware erred in accepting his plea, in its calculation of 
the intended loss as $400,000, and in its four -level 
sentencing increase for his leadership r ole in criminal 
activity that involved five or more participants. Youla's 
counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that Youla's 
appeal raises no nonfrivolous issues. After r eviewing 
counsel's Anders brief, we are not persuaded. Finding 
arguable merit to the appeal, we shall dischar ge current 
counsel, appoint substitute counsel, restor e the case to the 
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calendar, and order supplemental briefing in accordance 
with this opinion. 
 
II. 
 
In February 1998, Youla and Sidiky Mara ("Mara") met 
with an FBI cooperating witness, known to them as Moe, to 
buy credit cards in a financial fraud scheme. Moe 
purported to have a cousin who worked for MBNA, a 
national banking association, and who could secur e credit 
cards without going through the pr oper application 
procedures. In exchange for twenty cr edit cards, each with 
a credit limit of $50,000, Youla and Mara were to pay Moe 
$20,000. During meetings with Moe, Youla intr oduced Jibril 
Koita and Eric Washington into the scheme to defraud 
MBNA. 
 
While small withdrawals on the cards could be made at 
an automated teller machine ("ATM"), in order to obtain 
larger cash advances the recipients would need appropriate 
identification, including Social Security numbers and 
addresses. Youla and Mara provided Moe with twenty 
names and Social Security numbers, several of the names 
and eight of the numbers being false. With this information, 
MBNA investigators and the FBI opened twenty cr edit card 
accounts with a $50,000 credit limit for each. 
 
On February 26, 1998, Youla and Mara dr ove from New 
York City to Wilmington, Delawar e according to plan. Youla, 
Mara, and Moe met with an undercover FBI agent posing as 
Moe's cousin, who showed them twenty credit car ds. Youla 
and Mara tested one of the cards by withdrawing $500 from 
a nearby ATM. Satisfied that the cards were activated, the 
two were to return to Wilmington the next day with 
$20,000 for the credit cards. 
 
After the FBI agent left, Mara confided in Moe that he 
had secretly kept the cardboard flyer attached to the credit 
card, which displayed the card number . Mara and Youla 
subsequently left Moe, and Moe then reported the theft to 
MBNA whereupon the card was immediately deactivated. 
Meanwhile, Youla and Mara attempted to use the card, only 
to learn that it had been deactivated. Suspecting that Moe 
was involved with law enforcement, Youla and Mara did not 
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return to Wilmington the next day. Over the next eleven 
days, MBNA received numerous phone calls from 
individuals who gave names from the list Y oula and Mara 
provided Moe, all claiming that their car ds were lost or 
stolen. MBNA determined that most of the calls were 
fraudulent, but did send out three replacement cards. One 
replacement card was sent to Eric W ashington, but this 
card was never activated after MBNA deter mined that the 
account was fraudulent. The other two replacement cards 
went to a Sidiky Mala,1 and wer e subsequently deactivated 
after MBNA investigated a $1.00 purchase r ecorded at a 
gas station. In sum, a total of $501 was withdrawn or spent 
on the credit accounts. 
 
On October 13, 1998, a grand jury for the District of 
Delaware handed down a four count indictment charging 
Youla with bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1344 
(Count One), conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. S 371 (Count Two), and use of a false Social 
Security number in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 408 (Counts 
Three and Four). 
 
On November 25, 1998, Youla appeared with counsel in 
the District Court for the purpose of entering a guilty plea 
to Count Two of the indictment -- conspiracy to commit 
bank fraud. The District Court refused to accept the plea 
because during a colloquy Youla denied an intent to 
defraud MBNA. 
 
On December 4, 1998, Youla again appear ed with 
counsel in District Court for the purpose of entering a 
guilty plea. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Y oula entered a 
guilty plea to Count Three of the indictment charging 
fraudulent use of a Social Security number to open a credit 
card account. The District Court entered into a lengthy 
colloquy with Youla to ensure that he understood the 
charge to which he was pleading guilty, and to ensure that 
the plea was being entered voluntarily. 
 
Satisfied that Youla understood his Constitutional rights 
and that his decision to plead guilty was knowing and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mara had given the alias of "Sidiky Mala" to obtain credit cards for 
two 
accounts. 
 
                                4 
  
voluntary, the District Court accepted the plea, and 
sentenced Youla on February 26, 1999 to a ter m of thirty- 
three months imprisonment, a $6000 fine, a $100 
assessment, and a three year term of supervised release. In 
arriving at this sentence, the District Court set the base 
offense level at six in accordance withS 2F1.1(a) of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("Sentencing Guidelines"). To 
that, the District Court added nine levels for the highest 
possible intended loss amount of $400,000 in accor dance 
with S 2F1.1(b)(1)(J) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which 
represents the number of false Social Security numbers 
given to secure eight credit cards, each with a credit limit 
of $50,000. In addition, the District Court added two levels 
for more than minimal planning in accor dance with 
S 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines and four levels 
for being an organizer and leader of criminal activity that 
involved five or more participants underS 3B1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Finally, the District Court 
subtracted three levels for acceptance of r esponsibility 
under S 3E1.1(a) and (b) of the Sentencing Guidelines, and 
calculated the total adjusted offense level as eighteen. 
 
III. 
 
A case such as this presents counsel with the competing 
interests of zealous advocacy for one's client, and the 
proscription against pressing frivolous ar guments to the 
court. In Anders, the Supreme Court established guidelines 
for a lawyer seeking to withdraw from a case when the 
indigent criminal defendant he represents wishes to pursue 
frivolous arguments on appeal. Presenting what amounts to 
a no-merit letter devoid of analysis will not suffice. Id. at 
745. 
 
       Counsel should, and can with honor and without 
       conflict, be of more assistance to his client and to the 
       court. His role as advocate requir es that he support his 
       client's appeal to the best of his ability. Of course, if 
       counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a 
       conscientious examination of it, he should so advise 
       the court and request permission to withdraw. That 
       request must, however, be accompanied by a brief 
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       referring to anything in the recor d that might arguably 
       support the appeal. 
 
Id. at 744. Such "conscientious examination" is grounded 
in the Constitutional requirement of substantial equality 
and fair process, which the Court notes "can only be 
attained where counsel acts in the role of an active 
advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of 
amicus curiae." Id.; see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 
20 (1956) (stating that equal justice demands that destitute 
defendants be afforded adequate appellate review). 
 
This Court's role is then to decide whether the case is 
wholly frivolous. If so, the Court can grant counsel's motion 
to withdraw and dismiss the appeal under federal law, or 
proceed to a decision on the merits if state law so requires. 
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. "On the other hand, if it finds any 
of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore 
not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, af ford the indigent 
the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal." Id. The 
Supreme Court recently explained in Smith v. Robbins, 120 
S. Ct. 746, 753 (2000), that the Anders guidelines are only 
suggestive, not prescriptive. See also United States v. 
Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir . 2000). 
 
Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) reflects the 
guidelines the Supreme Court promulgated in Anders to 
assure that indigent clients receive adequate and fair 
representation. 
 
        Where, upon review of the district court record, trial 
       counsel is persuaded that the appeal presents no issue 
       of even arguable merit, trial counsel mayfile a motion 
       to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. 
       California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), which shall be served 
       upon the appellant and the United States. The United 
       States shall file a brief in response. Appellant may also 
       file a brief in response pro se.  After all briefs have been 
       filed, the clerk will refer the case to a merits panel. If 
       the panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will 
       grant trial counsel's Anders motion, and dispose of the 
       appeal without appointing new counsel. If the panel 
       finds arguable merit to the appeal, it will discharge 
       current counsel, appoint substitute counsel, r estore 
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       the case to the calendar, and order supplemental 
       briefing. 
 
Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a). 
 
The Court's inquiry when counsel submits an Anders 
brief is thus twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately 
fulfilled the rule's requirements; and (2) whether an 
independent review of the record pr esents any nonfrivolous 
issues. Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780 (citing United States v. 
Tabb, 125 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 1997); and Wagner v. United 
States, 103 F.3d 551 (7th Cir 1996)). This Court, following 
the Seventh Circuit's analysis in T abb, established the first 
inquiry as dispositive: "except in those cases in which 
frivolousness is patent, we will reject briefs . . . in which 
counsel argue the purportedly frivolous issues aggressively 
without explaining the faults in the arguments, as well as 
those where we are not satisfied that counsel adequately 
attempted to uncover the best arguments for his or her 
client." Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781. In this case, we reject the 
Anders brief for the latter reason. 
 
A. Adequacy of Counsel's Anders Brief 
 
The duties of counsel when preparing an Anders brief are 
(1) to satisfy the court that counsel has thor oughly 
examined the record in search of appealable issues, and (2) 
to explain why the issues are frivolous. Marvin, 211 F.3d at 
780 (citing Tabb, 125 F.3d at 585, 586). Counsel need not 
raise and reject every possible claim. However , at a 
minimum, he or she must meet the "conscientious 
examination" standard set forth in Anders. Id. 
 
In his Anders brief before this Court, counsel's analysis 
of the merits of the potential appealable issues constituted 
two pages. With regard to sentencing, counsel's 
examination cites no case law, and is limited to the 
following: 
 
        The sentence imposed upon the appellant also 
       appears to have been without legal error . Based upon 
       the calculation that the applicable base offense level 
       was 18, with a criminal history category I, the 
       imposition of a sentence of imprisonment of 33 months 
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       fell within the applicable guideline range. Thus, there 
       is simply no basis for concluding that the District 
       Court's sentencing decision constituted an abuse of 
       discretion. 
 
Appellant's Br. Pursuant to Anders v. California at 4. 
Counsel fails to mention that the Presentence Investigation 
Report ("PIR") recommended an adjusted of fense level of 
sixteen, nor does he explain the discrepancy between the 
District Court's calculation and the PIR. Mor eover, counsel 
does not examine the factual or legal bases for the three 
upward adjustments of fifteen levels that the District Court 
made in determining Youla's sentence. The result was an 
increase in the guideline range of twenty-one to twenty- 
seven months recommended in the PIR to a range of 
twenty-seven to thirty-three months, and a sentence at the 
top of the latter range. 
 
In sharp contrast, Youla's twenty-six page pro se brief 
presents three issues for appeal, two alleging errors in the 
District Court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
While the length of a brief does not necessarily determine 
the merit of its arguments, we do not believe that Youla's 
counsel "mention[s] all the issues raised by his client and 
assure[s] us that he has consider ed them and found them 
patently without merit." Marvin, 211 F .3d at 781. Moreover, 
Youla's counsel has not specifically set forth why he 
abandoned any sentencing objections, particularly those 
that Youla argues in his pr o se brief. In sum, as in Marvin, 
"[c]ounsel simply has not provided sufficient indicia that he 
thoroughly searched the recor d and the law in service of his 
client so that we might confidently consider only those 
objections raised." Id. Therefor e, we reject the Anders brief 
as inadequate. 
 
B. Arguable Merits to the Appeal 
 
The Seventh Circuit in Wagner clarified the standard for 
determining whether to accept counsel's statement, via an 
Anders motion and brief, that there ar e no nonfrivolous 
grounds for appeal. Specifically, the Court considered how 
deeply the appellate courts must explore the r ecord to 
determine whether to grant the motion. See Wagner, 103 
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F.3d at 552. The Wagner court rejected a complete scouring 
of the record by the courts and identification of the issues 
for the defendant -- effectively serving as his lawyer -- for 
while in some cases it may help the defendant, in others it 
may hurt him. See id. Where the Anders brief initially 
appears adequate on its face, the proper course"is for the 
appellate court to be guided in reviewing the r ecord by the 
Anders brief itself." Id. at 553. However, that is not the 
status of the brief here. 
 
Although the Anders brief does not assist us, we note 
that Youla's pro se brief does provide this Court with some 
guidance concerning the issues he wishes to raise on 
appeal. Although not the brief of counsel, we find that it 
"explains the nature of the case and . . . discusses the 
issues that the type of case might be expected to involve." 
In such a circumstance, we extrapolate fr om Wagner's 
recommendation that we confine our scrutiny to those 
portions of the record identified by an adequate Anders 
brief, see id., so that our examination of the record is 
informed by those issues raised in Appellant's pro se brief. 
 
An appeal on a matter of law is frivolous wher e "[none] of 
the legal points [are] arguable on their merits." Neitzke v. 
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. 
at 744). After examining the record, wefind that Youla has 
raised a nonfrivolous issue with respect to his sentencing, 
particularly whether the District Court corr ectly determined 
the intended loss at $400,000 based the credit limit of eight 
credit cards.2 When applying S 2F1.1 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, courts are bound by the Commentary thereto. 
See United States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 
(1993)). Application Note 8 of the corresponding 
Commentary provides in relevant part: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. With respect to the remaining arguments advanced by Youla, namely 
that the District Court erred in allowing Y oula to plead guilty and in 
its 
finding that Youla's offense level should be increased four levels 
pursuant to S 3B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines for his being an 
organizer or leader of criminal activity involving five or more 
participants, 
we agree with counsel's Anders brief that they represent frivolous issues 
without arguable merit. 
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       Consistent with the provisions of S 2X1.1 (Attempt, 
       Solicitation, or Conspiracy), if an intended loss that the 
       defendant was attempting to inflict can be deter mined, 
       this figure will be used if it is greater than the actual 
       loss. 
 
Sentencing Guidelines S 2F1.1, cmt. n.8 (1998). In S 2X1.1, 
judges are instructed to calculate the of fense level for an 
attempted offense by taking the number for the completed 
offense and subtracting three. These sections might be 
applied to credit card fraud in the following way: if the 
court determines that the defendant intended to use the 
stolen credit cards to their maximum limits but did not do 
so, the sum of those credit limits is plugged into 
S 2F1.1(b)(1) to determine the level that would apply if the 
crime had been completed, and then three is subtracted 
from this number per S 2X1.1.3  See United States v. Tobi, 
No. 91-3662, 1992 WL 78109 (6th Cir. Apr . 17, 1992); 
United States v. Derryberry, Nos. 90-6563, 91-5005, 1991 
WL 224061 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1991). W e believe that, in 
light of the Commentary's reference toS 2X1.1, there is 
arguable merit to Youla's sentencing claim. 
 
Where counsel's brief is inadequate, the Seventh Circuit 
recommends denying the Anders motion and either 
directing counsel to file a new brief or discharging counsel 
and appointing a new lawyer for the defendant. See 
Wagner, 103 F.3d at 553. Our Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) 
directs us to the second course -- we dischar ge current 
counsel when we find arguable merit to the appeal. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the Anders brief filed 
by counsel in this case. The motion of counsel for leave to 
withdraw will be granted. See United States v. Orozco, 98 
F.3d 105, 106, n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (granting counsel's Anders 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. For example, S 2X1.1(b)(1) provides with respect to an attempted 
offense: 
 
       If an attempt, decrease by 3 levels, unless the defendant completed 
       all the acts the defendant believed necessary for successful 
       completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances 
       demonstrate that the defendant was about to complete all such acts 
       but for apprehension or interruption by some similar event beyond 
       the defendant's control. 
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motion to withdraw where the brief was inadequate, and 
appointing new appellate counsel to examine the 
nonfrivolous issue). In accordance with our Local Appellate 
Rule 109.2(a), we shall order the Clerk to discharge current 
counsel, appoint substitute counsel, restor e the case to the 
calendar, and fix a subsequent briefing schedule. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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